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Abstract 
We are living in a digital and information-driven age and need to store information related to virtually 
every aspect of our lives, nuclear information included. For computer system to be reliable and secure in 
nuclear facilities, unauthorized event changes must be prevented (which means maintaining - 
confidentiality), field device inputs and outputs must remain immutable throughout their usable lifetime 
(which means maintaining - integrity), and all component parts should remain in an operable state (which 
means maintaining - availability).The dynamic and complex nature of cyber threats has made it a serious 
challenge to secure computer systems in nuclear facilities. A number of varied cyber security services, 
policies, mechanisms, strategies and regulatory frameworks have been adopted , including: 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, encipherment, defense-in-depth (DID), design 
basis threat (DBT), IAEA technical guidance documents such as: GS-R-1, GS-R-2, GS-R-3, GS-G-3.1-
3.5, NSS20, NSS23-G, NSS13, NSS17, NST036, NST045, and  NST047, IEEE standard 7-4.3.2-2010, 
NIST SP 800-53, NIST SP 800-82, NEI 04-04, NEI 08-09 and country-specific requirements such as: 10 
CFR 73.54, RG 5.71 (U.S.NRC), KINS/RG-N08.22 (South Korea). However, threats remain persistent. 
This paper is aimed at providing a regulatory perspective on nuclear cyber security, its relationship to 
nuclear safety and security, regulatory requirements and global best practice recommendations for nuclear 
cyber security, and strategies to prevent and counteract threats. This study is imperative as Nigeria 
prepares to join the league of countries with operational nuclear power plants and research reactors 
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following approval and adoption of the nuclear power programme roadmap in 2007 and contract signing 
with Rosatom of Russia for NPP and research reactor construction. 
 
Keywords: Cyber security, nuclear security, nuclear power plants, critical digital assets 
 
I. Introduction, Motivation, Goals, Scope and 
Methodology 
Cyber security includes all processes and mechanisms by which any digital equipment, information or 
service is protected from unintended or unauthorized access, change or destruction. As a component of 
nuclear security and the design basis threat (DBT) [1], cyber security is the range of measures enacted to 
prevent, detect, or respond to the theft of Category I nuclear material or to the sabotage of a nuclear 
facility, which could result in catastrophic radiological consequences by either exploiting vulnerabilities 
in information and computer systems alone or combined with physical attacks [2]. According to the 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.71, cyber-attack is 
the manifestation of either physical or logical (i.e., electronic or digital) threats against computers, 
communication systems, or networks that may originate from either inside or outside the licensee’s 
facility, have internal and external components,  involve physical or logical threats, be directed or non-
directed in nature, be conducted by threat agents having either malicious or non-malicious intent and have 
the potential to result in direct or indirect adverse effects or consequences to critical digital assets (CDAs) 
or critical systems (CSs). This includes attempts to gain unauthorized access to a CDA and/or CS’s 
services, resources, or information, the attempt to compromise a CDA and/or CSs Integrity, Availability, 
or Confidentiality (C.I.A triad) or the attempt to cause an adverse impact to a Safety, Security and 
Emergency Preparedness (SSEP) functions. 
 
The increasing wave of digitization of systems and processes has necessitated the upgrade of analog 
instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) to digital I&C systems, i.e. 
systems based on computers and microprocessors to monitor, operate, control, and protect those facilities. 
Digital systems offer higher reliability, better plant performance and additional diagnostic capabilities. 
Analog systems will gradually become obsolete in the general IT paradigm shift to digital I&C systems. 
About 40% of the world's operating nuclear reactors have been modernized to include at least some 
digital I&C systems. Most new NPPs incorporate digital I&C systems. Digital I&C systems have posed 
new challenges for the nuclear industry and regulators, who are responsible for designing the methods, 
data and experience to assure themselves that the new systems meet all reliability and performance 
requirements. In general, countries that have more new builds have had greater incentives and 
opportunities to develop the needed capabilities. Other countries are still in the process of doing so.  
According to the 2018 Verizon DBIR report, more than 25% of cyber-attacks have been at the hands of 
insiders who exploit their authorized access. Trusted employees, contractors, and business partners pose a 
substantial risk to organizations. They often have the ability to bypass many security controls that focus 
on keeping outsiders out and are not capable of viewing insider activity or are tuned to ignore actions by 
authorized users. In the cloud, security teams have to understand the extent of these insider threats and 
enforce appropriate cloud controls to detect unauthorized actions by insiders. The threat posed by cyber-
attacks often as a national and international security concern has grown in sophistication, frequency of 
occurrence and scale over the years, as shown in Figure 3. The problem is complicated by the 
involvement of nation states in these attacks as shown in Figure 4, attacks which had previously been the 
exclusive domain of private hackers, script kiddies and organized criminal groups. Attacks restricted to 
networks and financial computer systems have been extended to all IT and ICS components of nuclear 
facilities with all the implications, risks and potential radiological consequences such attacks pose to 
lives, property and the environment. 
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The importance of this paper is underscored by the fact that nuclear security is tremendously impacted by 
cyber security. Nuclear facilities made up of field devices, field controllers, supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) and instrumentation and control (I&C) systems as shown in Figure 1 are mission-
critical infrastructure that are susceptible to attacks from Nation States and non-state actors like 
hactivist/hactivism, third-parties, organized crime, professional criminals, spies, voyeurs, corporate 
raiders, disgruntled insiders, vandals, script kiddies and cyber terrorists as shown in Table 1.1. The 
various threat actors have different motivations, intentions for their activities, and capabilities, which adds 
to the complexity of the problem and increases the need for comprehensive understanding of the risks at 
regional, industry, institutional and process levels. 
 
Table 1.1 Cyber threat actors, Description of activities and Motivation 
S. No. Threat Actor Description Motivation 
1. Nation State Hackers directly employed directly 
an arm of a national government to 
penetrate commercial and/or 
government computer systems in 
other countries. 
• Cyber espionage 
2. Hactivist/Hactivism Individuals or groups who use 
digital tools looking to advance their 
own social, political and ideological 
agendas. 
• Political and/or 
social change 
• Thrill seeking 
• Reputational 
damage 
3. Third Parties Third party vendors and service 
providers who: 
a. Have access to data 
b. Have access to systems 
c. Have access to facilities 
• Immediate 
financial gain 
• Collect information 
for future financial 
gains 
• Competitive 
advantage 
• Collusion with 
other threat actors 
4. Organized Crime Highly structured criminal 
organizations and groups of hackers 
that seek to attack under-defended 
targets and exploit vulnerabilities 
• Immediate 
financial gain 
• Collect information 
for future financial 
gains 
5. Insiders Current or former employees who 
may be disgruntled or under duress 
using internal access and authority 
for nefarious purposes 
• Personal 
advantage, 
monetary gains 
• Malevolent 
behaviors 
(revenge) 
• Bribery, 
blackmail/coercion/ 
• collusion 
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In May 2018, there were 450 nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation around the world, 
generating 393, 836 MW(e) total out of which 195 units (43.3%) were built in the last 30 years 
and 319 units (70.8%) were constructed during the last 25 years. Currently there are 439 
operational nuclear reactors net installed capacity across 31 countries according to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) 
database. These critical facilities use both analog and digital systems to monitor and operate 
plant processes, equipment, and store and retrieve information. In addition to physical and 
system operational security, cyber security of CDAs and computer instrumentation and control 
systems (ICS), networks have become a growing concern to both nuclear operators and nuclear 
facility regulators around the world. I&C components such as process control systems (PCS), 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), digital control systems (DCS) that 
interconnect plant systems performing safety, security, and emergency preparedness (SSEP) 
functions are not isolated from the Internet. This presents an attack vector for cyber threats as 
shown in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Highly simplified representation of process control system 
Source: Kesler, B. (2011). The Vulnerability of Nuclear Facilities to Cyber Attack. Strategic Insights, Vol. 10, Issue 1, 
p.16. 
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Figure 1.2: SCADA system in a nuclear facility 
Source: NIST Special Publication 800-82 Rev 2 Draft: Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, p.2-6, 2014. 
(U.S) 
 
According to the Insurance Information Institute (I.I.I) and J.D. Power 2018 Small Business Cyber 
Insurance and Security Spotlight Survey, 10 percent of small businesses surveyed suffered one or more 
cyber incidents in the prior year, and average cost of cyber-related losses over the past year was $188,400. 
Only about one-third of firms surveyed had cyber insurance, nearly 60 percent of respondents said their 
company is very concerned about cyber incidents - and 70 percent think that the risk of being victimized 
by a cyber-attack is growing at an alarming rate as shown in Figure 1.3. These attacks are orchestrated by 
Nation States and non-state actors like hactivist/hactivism, third-parties, organized crime, professional 
criminals, spies, voyeurs, corporate raiders, disgruntled insiders, vandals, script kiddies and cyber 
terrorists as shown in Figure 1.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Number of data breaches 2006-2015 
Source: Identity Theft Resource Centre: https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime 
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Figure 1.4: The cyber threat landscape 
Source: https://emerginrisk.com/our-approach-4/threat-landscape/ 
 
Currently, the focus is not on new types of threats, but on existing types that are enhanced. As regards 
social engineering attacks, for example, a professionalization of the analysis followed by targeting can be 
observed. Perimeter security and cloud security measures are no longer sufficient. Increasingly, endpoint 
security is in demand again. It is also advisable to keep an eye on the hardware, as it may serve as target 
platform for firmware attacks. The impairment of products and standards continues to be a key issue. If 
these impairments affect widely used products and standards and remain undetected for a long time, they 
may be disastrous in terms of information security. A good example of this is Heartbleed. Therefore, it is 
advisable to reduce products' functionality to the maximum and, as a result, avoid the integration of 
potential vulnerabilities in unnecessary modules. It is also recommended not activating sensitive or hardly 
used modules by default (secure defaults). System providers using security-relevant products and 
standards should have several complementary security layers, including controls, in place. This allows 
them to reduce potential effects of such impairments (defense in depth). As a general rule, attacks are 
becoming more complex and more difficult to identify. For this reason, identifying misuse by means of 
user behavior analytics and adaptive security measures are gaining in importance. 
 
In addition, game-changing events like the increase in the number of advanced persistent threats (APTs) 
such as the Taj Mahal framework and Stuxnet, malware, Trojan attacks and ransomware attacks at the 
personal, corporate and even state levels. A careful examination of cyber-attacks targeted at NPPs from 
1980 to present reveals a pattern of increasing incidence of attack and sophistication. Particularly, 2014 
presented multiple computer event that had direct impact or relevance for nuclear. Notable examples 
include: Bruce NPP (1990), Sellafield (1991), Ignalina (1991), Kurchatov (1991), Davis-Besse Nuclear 
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Power Plant Slammer worm attack on August 20, 2003 which started at the contractor's site and spread to 
the corporate plant network shutting down the digital portion of Safety Parameter Display (SPD) systems 
and Plant Process Control (PPC) for many hours. Others are: Brown's Ferry (2006), Hatch NPP (2008), 
Stuxnet at Iranian nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz in June 2010 (Figure 1.5); Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (2011), Shamoon (2011), Areva (2011), RSA hack (2011), Aurora Test (2011), Red October 
(2011), Susquehanna NPP (2012), Monju NPP (2014), The Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power malware 
attack on December 9, 2014 meant to shut down the NPP, Anthem in 2014; Premera Blue Cross (2015), 
Target (2013), Japanese Nuclear Materials (2015), Gundremingen NPP (2016),  University of Toyama 
(2016), Ukraine NPP (2017), Wolf Creek NPP (2017), U.S and European Union NPPs (2018) Heartbleed 
cyber breaches in 2014 resulting in the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) system of the 
vendor's remote access computer serving as the attack vector as shown in Figure 1.6. The cyber security 
sectoral budget of U.S expended to detect and prevent these losses is even greater and has resulted in 
financial losses in the billions of dollars as shown in Figure 1.7, while growing sophistication in attack is 
shown in Figure 1.8. 
 
  
Figure 1.5: Timeline of Stuxnet at Natanz, Iran 
Source: Kaspersky Labs, Russia 
 
Figure 1.6: Cyber Incidents at NPPs 1980-2016 
Source: Gemalto Inc, U.S 
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Figure 1.7: Sectoral budget on Cyber security by U.S.A  
Source: U.S Office of Management and Budget 
 
Figure 1.8: Cyber Attack Sophistication 
Source: 
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-
in-2016/cyber-defense-nato-security-
role/EN/index.htm 
 
As a sub-set of nuclear security, the cyber threat landscape is highly dynamic and complex [1], it is a 
broad and wide-ranging discipline that interacts with all other areas of security in a nuclear facility. All 
disciplines of security complement each other to establish a facility’s security posture, which is defined in 
the site security plan (SSP) as shown in Figures 1.9 and 1.10. A failure in any of the disciplines of 
security could severely impact the other domains and could place additional burdens on the remaining 
aspects of security. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.9: Domains of nuclear security 
Source: 1. 9IAEA Nuclear Security Series 17: Computer 
Security at Nuclear Facilities (Technical Guidance), 
p.12, 2011. 
Figure 1.10: Nuclear security with safety & safeguards 
Source: 1.10https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/iscn/activity/2011-
12-08/2011-12-08-22.pdf 
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In order to counter this growing threat, this paper examines the current nuclear cyber security landscape 
vis-a-vis national and international regulatory frameworks and standards and also studies incidents and 
lessons learned with a view toward identifying critical gaps and making appropriate recommendations. 
This task was accomplished by adopting an open-source data gathering and analysis approach via 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security and safety guidance documents and by 
examining country-specific cyber security standards and practices from five selected nuclear-powered 
nations namely: China, Germany, Russian Federation, South Africa and the United States. The scope of 
this study is restricted to legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks for cyber security in civilian 
nuclear fuel cycle facilities, e.g., enrichment or fuel fabrication plants, power plants, reprocessing 
facilities, research reactors [2], etc. The justification for the focus on cyber security is that it is one of the 
most significant new key elements that have entered the nuclear security lexicon in the last decade, 
quickly gaining momentum, prominence and significance due to the growing reliance on digital 
equipment [2].  
 
The objective of cyber security is to protect information and property from theft, corruption, or natural 
disaster, while allowing the information and property remain accessible and useful to authorized users. 
Currently cyber security issues are the most important challenge of Information Technology (IT) 
development. As global infrastructure increasingly depends on IT with increasing complexity, its 
vulnerability increases. The U.S in other to combat the threat of cyber terrorism and other security threats 
from adversaries, it categorizes 13 critical infrastructure sectors under its Federal Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Policy: Agriculture, Banking and Finance, Chemicals and hazardous materials, Defense 
industrial base, Emergency services, energy, Food, Government, Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT), Postal and shipping, Public health and healthcare, Transportation, Drinking water and 
water treatment systems. Electric power in particular is the most critical infrastructure upon which other 
infrastructure depends. Threats to the power infrastructure include natural disasters, human errors, power 
system component failures, ICT system failures, gaming in the markets, intrusion and sabotage.   
 
Cyber security technologies have assisted in prevention, detection and response to cyber-attacks to critical 
digital assets (CDAs). Currently, there are a number of cyber security technologies that can be used to 
better protect CDAs from cyber-attacks according to Sklyar, 2012. In each of these categories, many 
technologies are currently available, while other technologies are still being researched and developed. 
Table 1.2 summarizes some of the common cyber security technologies, categorized by the type of 
security control they help to implement. Critical infrastructure sectors use all of these types of cyber 
security technologies to protect their systems. However, the level of use of technologies varies across 
sectors and across entities within sectors. 
 
Table 1.2: Cyber Security Technologies Control Categories and Types [3] 
 Control Category Control Type 
1. Access Controls Boundary protection: Firewalls, Content 
management 
Authentication: Biometrics, Smart tokens 
Authorization: User rights and privileges 
2. System Integrity Antivirus software 
File integrity checkers 
3. Cryptography Digital signatures and certificates 
Virtual private networks 
4. Audit and Monitoring Intrusion detection systems 
Intrusion prevention systems 
Security event correlation tools 
Computer forensics tools 
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5. Configuration management and 
assurance 
Policy enforcement applications 
Network management 
Continuity of operations 
Scanners 
Patch management 
 
There are a lot of different approaches to implement and manage cyber security measures. On from the 
approaches is Open Security Architecture (OSA). The OSA Metamodel depicts the entities and 
relationships that are relevant for OSA as shown in Figure 11. OSA can provide benefits to IT service 
consumers, IT service suppliers and IT vendors, giving the entire IT community an interest in using and 
improving. An open approach means that the patterns and catalogues will benefit the whole community 
and can be more quickly improved and refined by the common experience of participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.11: Open security architecture (OSA) Metamodel  
Source: www.opensecurityarchitecture.org 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides an overview of related works in 
computer/information security and nuclear cyber security. Section 3 deals with nuclear cyber security 
model frameworks and standards. Section 4 highlight current status and examples of digital I&C systems 
in nuclear power plants. Section 5 deals with cyber security regulatory requirements for nuclear facilities. 
Section 6 outlines global best practice recommendations on nuclear cyber security for Regulators. Section 
7 highlights the implications of cyber security incidents for research and practices. Section 8 points out 
the various lessons learned and section 9 is the summary and conclusion respectively. 
II. Related Works 
According to Tanenbaum and van Steen (2002), before one can evaluate attacks against a system and 
decide on appropriate mechanisms to fend off these threats, it is necessary to specify a security policy. A 
security policy defines the desired properties for each part of a secure computer system. It is a decision 
that has to take into account the value of the assets that should be protected, the expected threats and the 
cost of proper protection mechanisms. A security policy that is sufficient for the data of a normal home 
user may not be sufficient for a bank, as a bank is obviously a more likely target and has to protect more 
valuable resources. In general, there is a flow of data from a source (e.g., a host, a file, memory) to a 
destination (e.g., a remote host, another file, or a user) over a communication channel (e.g., a wire, a data 
bus). The task of the security system is to restrict access to this information to only those parties (persons 
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or processes) that are authorized to have access, according to the security policy in use. Although 
literature uses different approaches to categorizing network attacks, in this paper, I will classify them into 
three (3) groups related to confidentiality, integrity and availability, known as the C.I.A triad of network 
security goals as shown in Figure 2.1. Confidentiality in the nuclear context implies that unauthorized 
logic changes must be prevented; integrity implies that field device inputs and outputs must remain 
immutable throughout their usable lifetime and availability means that all components should remain in 
an operable state. The U.S.NRC RG 5.71 developed best practices over the years that include the basic 
tenet that information security is a life-cycle process. Figure 2.2 shows the U.S.NRC nuclear cyber 
security life cycle model and Figure 2.3 depicts the critical digital asset (CDA) identification process 
respectively. 
 
Figure 2.1: Classification of computer security attacks with relation to security goals  
Source: Forouzan, B. (2003), p.733. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                        
Figure 2.2: Cyber Security Life Cycle 
Source: U.S.NRC RG 5.71, p.14 
Figure 2.3: CDA Identification process 
Source: U.S.NRC RG 5.71, p.16. 
 
For over 30 years, research in computer security has been ongoing. Notable intellectual successes include 
cryptographic protocols [4], the star-property [5], multilevel security using information flow [6, 7], 
subject-object access matrix model [8], public-key cryptography [9], and access control lists [10]. In spite 
of these successes, it seems fair to say that the security of billions of deployed computer systems around 
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the world is suspect. Taxonomy defines what data are to be recorded and how like and unlike samplings 
are to be distinguished [11]. The C.I.A triad - Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability security goals can 
be threatened by security attacks. The snag is the lack of consensus on the approach to adopt in 
categorizing the attacks. Previous work has been done in the area of classifying threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Early taxonomies such as (Bishop, 1995) [12], focused on categorizing security vulnerabilities in software 
to assist security practitioners in maintaining more robust and secure systems through an understanding of 
these vulnerabilities. One approach to gaining insight into an attacker's target is to consider the attack 
paths, or combination of exploits [13]. John Howard extended this idea in his 1997 doctoral work in 
which he analyzed and classified 4,299 security related incidents on the internet. Howard’s work was 
notable because he included attackers, results and objectives as classification categories expanding threat 
taxonomies beyond the technical details of an attack to include more intangible factors such as an 
attacker’s motivation for conducting an attack [14]. The vast majority of threat taxonomies are designed 
as attacker-centric frameworks which categorize attacks from the perspective of an attacker’s tools, 
motivations and objectives. Killouri, Maxion and Tan created taxonomy in 2004 designed to be defense-
centric based on how an attack manifested itself in the target systems. Based on a test set of 25 attacks, 
this taxonomy was able to predict whether or not the defender’s detection systems would be able to detect 
a given type of an attack [15]. 
 
In a similar effort, Mirkovic and Reiher created taxonomy of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
defenses, which categorized DDoS defense mechanisms based on activity level, degree of co-operation 
and deployment location [16]. These two taxonomies are among the few that classify threats or security 
incidents from a defensive viewpoint and show the importance of addressing such issues from different 
perspectives to gain a more holistic view of security issues. Researchers at the University of Memphis led 
by Simmons created a cyber-attack taxonomy called AVOIDIT in 2009, which described attacks using 
five (5), extensible classifications: Attack Vector, Operational Impact, Defense, Informational Impact, 
and Target [17]. In recent years, a number of researchers have begun to look at creating taxonomies 
specifically addressing SCADA systems. In 2010 Fovino, Coletta & Masera created a comprehensive 
taxonomy describing SCADA architecture, vulnerabilities, attacks and countermeasures [18]. In 2011 
Zhu, Joseph, & Sastry highlighted the difference between what they termed standard information 
technology (IT) systems versus SCADA systems and focused on systematically identifying and 
classifying attacks against SCADA systems [19]. 
 
The efforts present certain challenge: although they provide background information related to cyber 
threats that could be utilized to address future developments, the taxonomies in question do not properly 
capture the protection of nuclear facilities in the light of existing cyber threats and legal and regulatory 
frameworks. This is because nuclear digital systems are in nature different from general information and 
telecommunication systems. Because cyber-attacks against nuclear power plants can result in grievous 
consequences in the forms of human, environmental and infrastructural damages, nuclear digital systems 
are long-term, real-time systems that demands simultaneous responses to intrusions 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week for the entirety of their 30 to 40 years lifespan. 
 
In 2015, Gluschke et. al. (2015) [2] characterized country-specific nuclear cyber regulatory practices and 
introduced a potential model for developing a national approach to cyber security at nuclear facilities. 
Similarly, in 2016 Dine, Assante, & Stoutland (2016) [20] highlighted the vulnerabilities of IT and ICS 
systems in nuclear facilities around the world, comparing country-specific nuclear cyber regulatory 
frameworks and best practices. Nuclear systems demand a comprehensive security measure that considers 
system life cycle, work processes and procedures as well as infrastructural protection spanning measures 
for system developers, system maintenance staffs, third-party contractors, consultants and workers within 
the plant.  In [30], Gluschke, Mesut & Macori (2018) three levels of cyber threats protection are 
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established as requirements: the internet network, the intra-network, and the independently blocked 
network. Staff within the plant can work only within the intra-network. The internet and intra-network 
must be separated (air gap) to ensure full independence of the workspace and access. Internet access 
within the workspace must be authorized and separated from the intranet network. Although this 
separation can result in some inefficiencies and inconveniences, it provides an additional layer of security 
for the system to protect against cyber threats. The intra-network - must be connected with the 
independently blocked network, which controls specific nuclear infrastructure and critical information 
systems such as the nuclear reactors, computer systems, the centralized database management systems, 
the operating systems, turbine control systems, etc. This independently blocked network - transfers only 
simple operation information to the intra - network in order to ensure that new threats such as nuclear 
cyber terrorism and espionages are mitigated. In addition, a holistic approach that establishes legal and 
institutional frameworks for efficient radiation disaster management systems - must be in place to provide 
standards and procedures for regulating and controlling illegal transfer of radioactive and nuclear 
materials and for handling sabotage by cyber attackers. 
 
In Cyber security at Nuclear Facilities: National Approaches, a research conducted by the Institute for 
Strategic Studies (ISS) at the Brandenburg University of Applied Sciences, Germany and United States 
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), they focused on the legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks for 
cyber security by examining in detail range of measures that affect the higher levels of the hierarchy of 
responsibilities [2]. The study’s comparative analysis focuses on national legislation, regulatory 
frameworks, regulations and guidance, licensing and other associated regulatory activities. However, the 
limitation of their study is their decision not to discuss on the more operational and technical aspects of 
cyber security and their implementation at the facility level. The following figure shows the various tiers 
of cyber security needed to address the cyber threat at nuclear facilities and indicates the tiers at the nation 
state level, which is the focus of this study. The NSS20 approach is broader than is needed for cyber 
security; but most essential elements can play a role when assessing a nation state in terms of nuclear-
cyber readiness, such as ‘Identification and Definition of Nuclear Security Responsibilities’, ‘Legislative, 
Regulatory Framework’ or ‘Identification and Assessment of Nuclear Security Threats’ [2]. Figure 2.4 
illustrate the defense-in-depth (DID) model for nuclear cyber security.  
 
A. National legislation 
At the highest level, legislation should ideally reflect a contemporary approach to nuclear security, 
incorporating concepts expressed in the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material (CPPNM) [2, 21], as well as including or referring to the security of information (or 
more explicitly cyber security) as one of the key elements of nuclear security. In this context it is 
probably more feasible to do so in those national legislations where nuclear security is separate from 
generic nuclear laws dealing with the promotion and regulation at large of any activity involving 
radioactive materials or nuclear energy generation [2]. Countries with or without specific nuclear security 
legislation are shown in table 2.1, while those with cyber legislation are shown in Table 2.2. 
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Facility Level 
Figure 2.4: Defense-in-depth model for cyber security in the nuclear context, Source: [2] 
 
Table 2.1: Specificity of nuclear security legislation [2] 
Characteristics Countries 
No nuclear law China 
A generic "nuclear law" dealing broadly with issues relating to the 
implementation of nuclear power with few or no explicit references to 
nuclear security 
South Africa [22] 
A generic "nuclear law" with explicit references or detailed sections 
dedicated to nuclear security 
 
A law specifically dedicated to nuclear security (the latter often in 
conjunction with more generic "nuclear laws" within the same legal 
system) 
U.S.A [23], Germany [24] 
Russia [25, 26]  
 
Table 2.2: Countries with Cyber security legislation [2] 
Characteristics Countries 
No legislation regarding cyber security is in place U.S.A., China 
Legislation on cyber security is in place, no explicit provisions for 
critical infrastructure or nuclear facilities 
South Africa [27, 28] 
Legislation on cyber security is in place, and either has dedicated 
sections for critical infrastructure or nuclear facilities or separate 
laws covering the cyber security of these exist 
Russia [29], Germany [30] 
 
Legislation                                     
Regulatory Framework          Nation State's Level 
Licensing Process 
Quality Assurance Program 
Training and Qualification 
Good Operating & Maintenance Practices 
Intrusion Detection Systems 
Approved Procedures 
Security Systems 
Physical Barriers 
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B. Regulatory framework 
Similarly, legislation should operate at the proper level and avoid rapid obsolescence by steering clear of 
legislating specific details which are bound to evolve rapidly (like technology) and should instead focus 
on establishing the framework for the correct operation of a regulatory authority, with regard to its ability 
to write and enforce regulation and to criminalize and prosecute relevant crimes [2]. Table 2.3 shows 
countries with or without competent authorities for cybersecurity at their respective nuclear facilities. 
 
Table 2.3: Competent Authority for Cyber Security at Nuclear Facilities [2] 
Characteristics Countries 
No competent authority explicitly regulating cyber security at 
nuclear facilities has been established 
China 
Cyber security at nuclear facilities is the responsibility of the 
nuclear regulatory body 
Germany, U.S.A, South Africa 
Cyber security at nuclear facilities is the responsibility of the 
cyber regulatory body 
Russia 
C. Regulations and guidance 
Regulations instead, are standards adopted as rules by the relevant authority to implement, interpret, or 
make specific the laws enforced or administered by the authority itself. They are needed so that the 
industry may have clear and detailed instructions. At the same time, regulation can evolve and adapt more 
rapidly than legislation given a lighter approval/modification procedure that involves fewer stakeholders. 
A number of countries - for example, China and South Africa - have regulations pertaining to aspects of 
nuclear safety and cyber security that protect national infrastructure in general. There are no specific 
regulations in these countries related to the cyber security of nuclear facilities. Also, the status of the 
implementation of these regulations is elusive and can therefore not be said to be fully developed. The 
United States, Russia and Germany have written regulations in the cyber security of nuclear plants and 
the regulations are developed. [31] 
D. Licensing 
Ideally cyber security should be embedded into the design of nuclear facilities themselves and their 
associated security plans from the beginning. The crucial instruments to ensure that this occurs and is 
maintained through the lifecycle of an NPP – as a design goal and as an element of safety and security 
culture – are the licensing process and its enforcement [2]. In Germany and the United States 
considerations for cyber security are explicitly detailed in the licensing process and in the certification 
process of individual systems. 
E. Associated regulatory activities 
From supply chain control, to personnel security, to law enforcement training, many different issues may 
have a strong impact on the cyber security of nuclear facilities. Regulatory activities for nuclear facilities 
should encompass and characterize how threat assessment  is  done,  how  cyber  security  training  is 
integrated in the programme, whether the nuclear supply chain is regulated, and whether cyber security is  
a  component  of  those  regulations. It is noteworthy that the United States and South Africa are nations 
that involve national intelligence agencies in the preparation of threat information and that this 
information is made available directly to nuclear facilities using the Design Basis Threat (DBT) model to 
communicate threats to facilities. 
 
F. Cyber Security Education 
Countries with very strong structure for nuclear facilities such as China and Russia, offer national level 
education and degree programmes in nuclear security. The majority of the countries delving into nuclear 
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facilities usage have educational programmes in cyber security, offered through universities. For example, 
Departments of Cyber Security now exist in Nigerian Universities. Although these programmes are new, 
often in their beginning stages, and the curriculum does not have contents that addresses nuclear cyber 
security. Russia, as of today, is one country where a national educational program for nuclear information 
technology (IT) and/or cyber security exists. Centers of higher education focused on cyber security or 
nuclear security can provide research, fundamental to advancing the field, as well as a highly trained 
workforce, which is necessary to ensure the adequate level of competence in the facilities [2]. 
 
III. Analysis of Model Frameworks and Standards 
This section provides detailed overview of cyber security Standards, Frameworks and Requirement 
specifications for addressing security vulnerabilities in IT/ICS systems used in NPPs. Cyber security 
Standards are set of specifications for the cyber security of I&C systems used in NPPs. A Framework is a 
risk-based approach to reducing cyber security risk. It comprises of three (3) parts: the Framework Core, 
the Framework Implementation Tiers and the Framework Profile [32] as shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Cyber security Framework structure 
 
The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity activities and references that are common across critical 
infrastructure sectors and are organized around particular outcomes. It comprises of four (4) types of 
elements: Functions, Categories, Sub-categories, and Informative References. The Framework 
Implementation Tier is a lens through which to view the characteristics of an organization's approach to 
risk - how an organization views cyber security risk and the processes in place to manage that risk. The 
Framework Profile is a representation of the outcomes that a particular system or organization has 
selected from the Framework Categories and Sub-Categories [32]. 
 
In other to address the security vulnerabilities arising from cybersecurity threats, several frameworks have 
been developed by industry standardization organizations, International and national nuclear regulatory 
agencies like: the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC), Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Nuclear Energy Institute 
(NEI), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), National Institutes of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.NRC), Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
(CNSC), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) etc. These frameworks are vital tools that can be 
leveraged to systematically address cyber security concerns in the nuclear sector.  
 
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Nuclear Sector has a long history of 
addressing cyber security issues. In 1997, through the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the industry began 
looking at potential issues associated with the increasing use of digital technologies at power reactors. At 
this time there was a concern regarding the potential impacts associated with the change in millennia—
referred to at that time as the “Y2K” issue. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
industry turned its focus to potential cyber security-related issues. In January 2002, NEI established a 
Cyber Security Task Force (CSTF), initially composed of 23 members, to provide an industry-wide forum 
Cyber Security Framework 
The Core Implementation Tiers Profile 
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for identifying, discussing, and resolving cyber security issues. In March 2002, the NRC issued Interim 
Compensatory Measures (ICM) Orders that directed licensees to consider and address cyber safety and 
security vulnerabilities [32].  
 
During 2003 and 2004, the industry was engaged in the development of guidance documents intended to 
support the uniform implementation of cyber security programs at power reactors. In July 2003, cyber 
security assessment pilots were completed at four U.S. nuclear power reactors. These pilots were 
designed to inform development of NUREG/CR-6847, “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. 
Nuclear Power Plants.” The project team consisted of representatives from the Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory (PNNL), the NRC, and the CSTF. NUREG/CR-6847 was released in November 2004. In 
November 2005, NEI released NEI 04-04, “Cyber Security Program for Power Reactors,” Revision 1. 
NEI 04-04 provides guidance on establishing and maintaining a cyber security program and incorporates 
assessment methodology described in NUREG/CR-6847.  
 
The NEI 04-04 program provides for the cyber security protection of all systems in the plant including 
those necessary for reliable electrical generation. The guidance provides a risk-informed approach, where 
consequences to plant functions are considered, and provides guidance on establishing a site cyber 
security defensive strategy incorporating multiple defensive layers with increasing levels of security 
protection. NEI 04-04 also provides guidance on incorporating cyber security considerations into the 
procurement process. The NEI 04-04 program includes the following steps [32]: 
• Define current cyber security program 
• Identify Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) 
• Validate configuration 
• Assess susceptibility 
• Assess consequences 
• Determine risk 
• Refine defensive strategy 
• Continue program management. 
 
In December 2005, the NRC informed NEI by letter that Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-04, “Cyber 
Security Program for Power Reactors,” Revision 1, dated November 18, 2005, is an acceptable method 
for establishing and maintaining a cyber security program at nuclear power plants. In 2006, the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) acknowledged that the NEI 04-04 program provides 
cyber security protection equivalent to the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability 
Standards [32].  
 
The nuclear industry established a Nuclear Strategic Issues Advisory Committee (NSIAC) that has the 
ability to establish initiatives binding to all nuclear power plants. The NSIAC is comprised of the Chief 
Nuclear Officers of each power plant site or fleet. Approved NSIAC initiatives are implemented at all 
U.S. nuclear power plants. In April 2006, the NSIAC established an initiative requiring nuclear power 
plants to implement NEI 04-04 within two years. All U.S. plants implemented the initiative by May 2008 
[32].  
 
Power plants are required by the NRC to design, implement, and evaluate their physical and cyber 
security programs to defend against a Design Basis Threat (DBT). In response to the increasing threat of 
cyber-related attacks, the NRC amended its design basis threat requirements in 2007 to include a cyber-
attack as an attribute of the adversary. The NRC describes a cyber-attack as:  
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“The capability to exploit site computer and communications system vulnerabilities 
to modify or destroy data and programming code, deny access to systems, and 
prevent the operation of the computer system and the equipment it controls.” 
 
In March 2009, the NRC issued revised security requirements that included comprehensive programmatic 
cyber security requirements, principally codified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 
Section 10 CFR 73.54, “Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks” 
(Rule). The Rule requires power plants to submit a cyber security plan and implementation schedule for 
NRC review and approval. To support uniform implementation, the industry developed a template for the 
cyber security plan and the implementation schedule. In May 2010 the NRC endorsed NEI 08-09, “Cyber 
Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors,” Revision 6. NEI 08-09 provides a template for cyber security 
plans and a catalog of technical, operational, and management cyber security controls tailored from the 
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, “Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information 
Systems,” Revision 2. The template for the implementation schedule provides eight milestones—seven 
interim milestones and an eighth milestone for full implementation. The first seven milestones are 
designed to address the most prominent threats to the plant’s most important systems [32]. 
 
These milestones include the establishment of a cyber security assessment team, hardware-based isolation 
of key networks and assets, tightening controls over portable media and equipment, enhancing existing 
insider threat mitigation, instituting protective measures for digital equipment that could impact key 
safety systems, and establishing ongoing monitoring and assessment activities for implemented cyber 
security measures. By December 31, 2012, each plant completed the initial seven milestones. Post-2012 
activities (the eighth milestone) include the completion of policy and procedural revisions that enhance 
existing capabilities, the completion of any remaining design-related modifications necessary to 
implement the cyber security plan, and institution of protective measures for lower consequence assets.  
In January 2013, the NRC began inspecting power plant cyber security program implementation of the 
initial seven milestones, and completed inspections at each power plant at the end of 2015 [32]. 
 
The frameworks for providing cyber security controls at NPPs can be categorized into two (2) broad 
classes: International and Country-specific. These international publications are consistent with, and 
complement, international nuclear security instruments, such as the amended Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material CPPNM), the Code of Conduct (CoC) on the Safety and Security of 
Radioactive Sources, United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1373 and 1540, and the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). 
 
The structure of the legal framework as shown in Figure 3.2, which forms the basis for regulation, have 
Law, Act, decree and Statute as the principal legislation established by the national legislative body. It 
establishes the fundamental structures and concepts, sets infrastructure for regulatory control and defines 
out the scope of the legislation. Regulations are more specific in relation to nuclear Cybersecurity, are 
developed by the Regulatory Body, are issued by the legislative body, Ministry or Regulatory Body 
(varies depending on the national legal system). Licenses are authorizations issued by Regulatory Bodies 
as clearance to operate showing compliance with regulatory requirements as regards Cybersecurity. 
Regulatory documents include Codes of Practices (CoPs), Guidance documents et cetera. They are 
usually developed and issued by the Regulatory Body, give practice specific advice on how to achieve 
protection and safety requirements defined in legislation or regulations; may or may not be legally 
binding - other procedures might be followed to achieve the same protection and safety goals. 
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Figure 3.2: IAEA hierarchy of normative instruments for nuclear safety and security 
Source: IAEA NSS No.17: Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (Technical Guidance), p.9, 2011. 
 
The international frameworks and Standards like IAEA publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series 
(NSS) and Basic Safety Standards (BSS) are issued in the following categories as shown in Figure 3.3:  
• Nuclear Security Fundamentals: contain objectives, concepts and principles of nuclear security 
and provide the basis for security recommendations. 
• Recommendations present best practices that should be adopted by Member States in the 
application of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals. 
• Implementing Guides provide further elaboration of the Recommendations in broad areas and 
suggest measures for their implementation. 
• Technical Guidance: publications include: Reference Manuals, with detailed measures and/or 
guidance on how to apply the Implementing Guides in specific fields or activities; Training 
Guides, covering the syllabus and/or manuals for IAEA training courses in the area of nuclear 
security; and Service Guides, which provide guidance on the conduct and scope of IAEA nuclear 
security advisory missions. 
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Figure 3.3: IAEA Safety Standard Series hierarchy  
Source: IAEA NSS No.17: Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (Technical Guidance), p.9, 2011. 
 
The selection of a framework should be informed by baseline assessment, risk appetite and governance 
model. The primary consideration to be made by those with accountability for cyber security of nuclear 
facilities is ensuring that when implementing a framework, linkages and integration are created with the 
governance model, risk appetite, strategic plan and the broader enterprise risk management functions. It is 
also important to consider the broader regulatory framework and environment to inform framework 
selection. These nuclear cyber security frameworks are categorized into IAEA and country-specific 
frameworks. The lists of nuclear cyber security frameworks, requirements, guidance are provided in 
Tables 3.1-3.3, while Table 3.4 highlights the comparative analysis of the main requirements of IAEA 
Draft, U.S NRC RG 5.71 and IEC 62645 CDI. 
 
Table 3.1: IAEA Nuclear Computer/Cyber Security Requirement Sources 
. Title of Publication Type Summary 
1 IAEA Nuclear Security Series Number 
20 (NSS 20): Objective and Essential 
Elements of a State's Nuclear Security 
Regime, 2013. 
Fundamentals Provide for the 
establishment of 
regulations and 
requirements for protecting 
the confidentiality of 
sensitive information and 
sensitive information 
assets. 
2. IAEA NSS 13: Nuclear Security 
Recommendations on Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material and 
Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev 
5), 2005. 
Recommendation Provides a set of 
recommended 
requirements to achieve the 
four Physical Protection 
Objectives and to apply the 
12 
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Fundamental Principles. 
Section 4.10 states: 
"Computer-based systems 
used for - physical 
protection, nuclear safety, 
and nuclear material 
accountancy and control 
should be protected against 
compromise (e.g. cyber-
attack, manipulation or 
falsification) consistent 
with the threat assessment 
or DBT." 
3. IAEA NSS No. 17: Computer Security 
at Nuclear Facilities, 2011. 
Technical Guidance Provide guidelines to 
personnel designing, 
implementing, and 
managing I&C and 
information systems (IS) 
and networks at nuclear 
facilities. It addresses 
prevention and detection of 
potential attacks through 
reference to best practices 
in architecture, assurance 
and management of 
security information and 
I&C systems. 
4. IAEA NSS No. 23-G: Security of 
Nuclear Information 
Technical Guidance Provides guidance on 
implementing the principle 
of confidentiality and on 
the broader aspects of 
information security (i.e. 
integrity and availability). 
It specifically seeks to 
assist Member States in the 
identification, 
classification, and 
assignment of appropriate 
security controls to 
information that could 
adversely impact nuclear 
security if compromised. 
5. IAEA Defense in Depth in Nuclear 
Safety (INSAG 10), 1996. 
 
Implementing 
Guide 
 
Provide NPPs with DID 
implementing guidelines. 
Outlines five (5) levels of 
DID that should be 
sustained at NPPs. 
6. IAEA NSS No. 33-T: Computer Security 
of Instrumentation and Control Systems 
at Nuclear Facilities, 2018. 
Technical Guidance Provides guidance for the 
protection of I&C systems 
at nuclear facilities on 
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computer security against 
malicious acts that could 
prevent such systems from 
performing their SSEP 
functions. Its scope 
includes application of 
computer security 
measures to I&C systems, 
application of such 
measures to the 
development, simulation 
and maintenance 
environments of these 
systems. 
7. IAEA Computer Security for Nuclear 
Security (NST045), 2016. 
Implementing 
Guide 
(Under 
development) 
Provide guidance on 
developing, implementing 
and integrating computer 
security as key component 
of nuclear security. 
Applies to the computer 
security aspects of nuclear 
security regime. 
8. IAEA Computer Security Techniques for 
Nuclear Facilities (NST047). 
Technical Guidance 
Under development) 
Provides discussion on 
good practices for 
implementing computer 
security associated digital 
technologies at nuclear 
facilities. 
9. IAEA Computer Security of I&C 
Systems at Nuclear Facilities (NST036), 
2016. 
Technical Guidance 
 
Provides guidance on 
implementing computer 
security controls across the 
life cycle of nuclear I&C 
and control systems. 
10. IAEA Conducting Computer Security 
Assessments (NST037), 2015. 
TECDOC Series Provides good practices for 
organizing and conducting 
computer security 
assessments associated 
with nuclear security. 
11. IAEA Computer Security Incident 
Response (NST038), 2015. 
TECDOC Series Provides good practices for 
implementing computer 
security incident response 
processes between 
competent authorities, 
operators, and technical 
support organizations. 
12. IAEA Computer Security during the 
Lifetime of a Nuclear Facility (NST051), 
2016. 
Technical Guidance 
 
Provide guidance to States, 
competent Authorities and 
operators on appropriate 
nuclear security measures 
during the different stages 
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in the lifetime of a nuclear 
facility. Covers nuclear 
safety, security and 
safeguards. 
 
Table 3.2: International Standards Organizations Cyber Security Requirement Sources 
. Title of Publication Type Summary 
1. IEEE 7-4.3.2-2016: Standard Criteria for 
Programmable Digital Devices in Safety 
Systems of Nuclear Power Generating 
Stations, 2016. 
Standard This standard serves to amplify 
criteria to IEEE Std 603(TM)-2009, 
to address the use of programmable 
digital devices as part of safety 
systems in nuclear power generating 
stations. The criteria contained 
herein, in conjunction with criteria in 
IEEE Std 603-2009, establish 
minimum functional and design 
requirements for programmable 
digital devices used as components 
of safety systems. 
2. IEEE 1686-2013: Standard for 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) 
Cyber Security Capabilities, 2008. 
Reference The standard defines functions and 
features to be provided in intelligent 
electronic devices (IEDs) to 
accommodate cybersecurity 
programs. It addresses security 
regarding the access, operation, 
configuration, firmware revision and 
data retrieval from an IED. 
Confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of external interface of 
the IED is also addressed. 
3. IEC 61513: Nuclear Power Plant - 
Implementation and Control Important 
to Safety General Requirements for 
Systems, 2011. 
Standard Provides requirements and 
recommendations for the overall 
I&C architecture which may contain 
either or both technologies. The 
main technical changes are 
alignment with the latest revisions of 
IAEA documents, alignment with 
the new editions of IEC 60880, IEC 
61226, IEC 62138, IEC 62340, IEC 
60987, alignment with significant 
advances of software engineering 
techniques and integration of 
requirements for staff training. 
4. ISO/IEC TR 13335-1: Information 
Technology - Guidelines for the 
Management of Information Technology 
Security, 2001. 
Standard Provide a standard for IT security. 
Consists of Five (5) parts: Concepts 
& models for managing & planning 
IT Security, Techniques for the 
Management of IT Security, 
Selection of safeguards & 
Management guidance on Network 
Security. 
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5. ISO/IEC 27000:2009 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 
ISO/IEC 27005:2008 
ISO/IEC 27006:2007 
Standard Developed from BS7799 published 
in the mid-1990. The British 
Standard accepted by ISO/IEC as 
ISO/IEC 17799:2000 revised in 2005 
and re-numbered in 2007 to align 
with other ISO/IEC 2700 series 
standards. It provides best practice 
recommendation on information 
security management for use by 
those with accountabilities for 
initiating, designing, maintaining 
information security management 
systems.     
 
Table 3.3: Country-Specific Cyber Security Requirement Sources 
. Title of Publication Country Type Summary 
1. NIST Special Publication 
800-82 Rev 2: Guide to 
Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) Security, 2014. 
U.S Standard Provide guidance for securing ICS, 
including SCADA, DCS and other 
systems performing control 
functions. Outlines notional 
overview of ICS, reviews typical 
system topologies and architectures, 
identifies known threats and 
vulnerabilities to these systems etc. 
2. NIST Special Publication 
800-30: Risk Management 
Guide for Information 
Technology Systems, 2002. 
U.S Reference Provide guidance for conducting 
risk assessments of Federal 
Information Systems and 
organizations, simplifying the 
guidance in SP 800-39. It satisfies 
the requirement of FISMA. 
3. NIST Special Publication SP 
800-53A Rev 1: Guide for 
Assessing the Security 
Controls in Federal 
Information Systems in 
Organizations, 2008. 
U.S Reference Provides guidelines for developing 
security assessment plans and 
associated security control 
assessment procedures that are 
consistent with SP 800-53, Revision 
3 in all phases of the development 
life cycle. 
4. NIST Special Publication 
800-53 Rev 3: Recommended 
Security Controls for Federal 
Information Systems and 
Organizations, 2009. 
U.S Reference This standard supersedes NIST SP 
800-53A Rev 1. It provides a set of 
security controls that can satisfy the 
breadth and depth of security 
requirements levied on information 
systems and organizations and that 
is consistent with and 
complementary to other established 
information security standards.  
5. NIST FIPS PUB 140-2: 
Security Requirements for 
Cryptographic Modules, 
2002. 
U.S Reference Is a Computer Security Standard 
used to approve cryptographic 
modules that include both software 
and hardware components? An 
24
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 6 [2020], No. 1, Art. 3
https://trace.tennessee.edu/ijns/vol6/iss1/3
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol.6 No.1, 2020 
 
initial publication was on May 25, 
2001 and was last updated 
December 3, 2002.  
6. NEI 04-04 Rev 1/NEI 08-09 
Rev 6: Cyber Security 
Program for Power Reactors, 
2005/2010 
U.S. Rule Provides a template for nuclear 
power reactor licensees with a 
means for developing and 
maintaining a cyber security 
program at their sites. The plan 
includes a defensive strategy that 
consists of a defensive architecture 
and a set of security controls that are 
based on NIST SP 800-82, Final 
Public Draft, Dated September 29, 
2008, "Guide to ICS," and NIST SP 
800-53, Revision 2, Recommended.  
7. NEI 10-04 Rev 2: Identifying 
Systems and Assets Subject 
to the Cyber Security Rules, 
2012. 
U.S. Rule Provide guidance on the 
identification of digital computer 
and communication systems & 
networks subject to the requirements 
of 10 CFR 73.54. Utilizes the 
licensee's Current Licensing Basis 
(CLB) to ascertain important-to-
safety functions in the context of the 
NRC Cyber Security Rule. 
8. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (N.R.C) 
Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.71: 
Cyber Security Programs for 
Nuclear Facilities, 2010. 
U.S. Regulatory 
Guide 
Provides comprehensive guidance to 
applicants and licensees on 
satisfying the requirements of 10 
CFR 73.54 that the OMB approved 
under OMB control number 3150-
002 by using NIST SP 800-53, Rev 
3 framework. 
9. N.R.C Regulatory Guide 
(RG) 73.54: Protection of 
Digital Computer and 
Communication Systems and 
Networks 
U.S. Reference Performance-based programmatic 
requirement that ensures that the 
functions of digital computers, 
communication systems, and 
networks associated with SSEP 
functions are protected from cyber-
attacks. Licensees provide high 
assurance that digital computer and 
communication systems and 
networks are adequately protected 
against cyber-attacks, up to and 
including the design-basis threat 
(DBT), as described in 10 CFR 
73.1, "Purpose and Scope". 
10. N.R.C Regulatory Guide 5.83 
(RG 5.83): Cyber Security 
Event Notifications, 2015. 
U.S Rule Addresses cyber security event 
notification requirements. Describes 
approaches and methodologies that 
staff of the U.S. N.R.C considers 
acceptable for use by NPP licensees 
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when categorizing certain cyber 
security event, and the process for 
conducting notifications and 
submitting written security follow-
up reports to the NRC for cyber 
security events. 
11. N.R.C Regulatory Guide 
(RG) 1.152 Rev 2 & 3: 
Criteria for Use of Computer 
in Safety Systems of Nuclear 
Power Plants, 2006. (U.S.) 
U.S Rule Provided specific guidance to 
nuclear power plant licensees for 
use in the design, development and 
implementation of IT/ICS systems. 
12. Template for the Cyber 
Security Plan Implementation 
Schedule 
U.S Rule Provides a template used by each 
operating power plant to establish 
the schedule for the implementation 
of their cyber security plans.  
13. Department of Homeland 
Security (D.H.S) Catalog of 
Control Systems Security: 
Recommendations for 
Standards Developers, 2009. 
U.S Reference The catalog presents a compilation 
of practices that various industry 
bodies have recommended to 
increase the security of control 
systems from both physical and 
cyber-attacks. 
14. D.H.S Cyber Security 
Procurement Language for 
Control Systems, Version 1.8, 
2008. 
U.S Reference Summarize security principles that 
should be considered when 
designing and procuring control 
systems products (software, 
systems, and networks) and provide 
example language to incorporate 
into procurement specifications. 
15. D.H.S Cyber Security 
Assessments of Industrial 
Control System, 2017. 
U.S Reference Covers the process of planning an 
ICS cyber security assessment, 
including how to select testing areas 
and reporting process. 
16. D.H.S Recommended 
Practice for Patch 
Management of Control 
Systems, 2008 
U.S Reference The report recommends patch 
management practices for 
consideration and deployment by 
ICS asset owners. It specifically 
identifies issues and recommends 
practices for ICS patch management 
in order to strengthen overall ICS 
security. 
17. D.H.S Recommended 
Practice: Improving Industrial 
Control Systems 
Cybersecurity with Defense-
in-Depth (DID) Strategies 
U.S Reference The report provides guidance for 
developing defense-in-depth 
strategies for organizations that use 
control systems networks while 
maintaining multi-tier information 
architectures. 
18. Regulatory Document 
(REGDOC) - 2.5.1: Design of 
Reactor Facilities - Nuclear 
Power Plants, 2014. 
Canada Regulatory 
Guide 
Provides overall status of Canadian 
regulatory framework for cyber 
security, as well as key requirements 
of new CSA standard N290.7-14. 
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Cyber Security aspects of 
Computer-based I&C systems. 
19. Korea Institute of Nuclear 
Safety Regulatory Guide - 
KINS/RG N08.22: Cyber 
Security for I&C System, 
2009. (South Korea) 
Republic 
of Korea 
Regulatory 
Guide 
Provides a framework for guidance 
in implementing cyber security 
controls at Korean NPPs. 
 
Table 3.4: Comparative analysis of the main requirements of IAEA Draft, U.S NRC RG 5.71 and IEC 62645 CDI [3] 
Document Categories IAEA Draft (66 pages) U.S NRC RG 5.71 
(105 pages) 
IEC 62645 CDI (37 
pages) 
Main entity and 
definition 
Computer security 
(synonym of cyber 
security) is a particular 
aspect of information 
security related to 
computer-based 
systems, networks and 
digital systems. 
Information security - 
the security of any 
information regardless 
of the media used to 
store or transmit the 
information. Includes 
the preservation of the 
confidentiality, 
integrity and 
availability attributes of 
information; in 
addition, other 
properties such as 
authenticity, 
accountability, non-
repudiation and 
reliability can also be 
involved.  
There is no security 
definitions Cyber 
security – protection 
against cyber-attacks is 
meant. 
No security definitions 
Computer security - 
reference to IAEA 
guidance The goal of 
the computer-based 
security is to protect the 
I&C systems from 
deliberate and 
intelligent attacks that 
may jeopardize overall 
plant safety and 
availability. 
Security Control Personnel security, 
Physical security, 
Nuclear security (in 
1.2.1, not in Glossary) 
Management systems, 
Organizational issues, 
Implementing computer 
security. 
 
Technical, Operational 
and Management 
control 
 
11 security categories 
and Security 
Programme 
management. 
 
Related documents Site Security Plan 
Computer Security Plan 
(can be a part of 
SSP) 
Cyber Security Plan 
Cyber Security 
Program 
Security Programme 
Computer Security Plan 
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Requirements to 
vendors 
 
It is paramount that the 
security department 
works closely with the 
contracts department to 
ensure that the security 
provisions are 
incorporated in each 
contract. When 
considered necessary, 
checks and audits 
should be made to 
ensure that the 
contracting 
organization’s 
management system 
adequately addresses 
security issues, and that 
the organization’s 
practices and measures 
are in compliance with 
the system. 
There are no direct 
requirements, only 
from utility point of 
view 
There are no direct 
requirements. Platform 
and application security 
are a part of operational 
security procedures. 
 
Life cycle 
 
Security management 
lifecycle (spiral shape) 
 
Security lifecycle 
process (spiral shape) 
Linear Life Cycle 
Implementation of 
Computer Security 
 
Levels of Security  Five levels of security 
(strength of Measures) 
Five levels of cyber 
security defensive 
architecture 
Five levels of computer 
security protective 
measures 
 
IV. Status and Examples of Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear 
Power Plants 
Nuclear power plants (NPPs) rely on I&C systems for protection, control, supervision and monitoring. A 
typical unit has approximately 10 000 sensors and detectors and 5000 km of I&C cables. The total mass 
of I&C related components is on the order of 1000 tonnes. This makes I&C system one of the heaviest 
and most extensive non-building structures in any nuclear power plant. No globally comprehensive 
statistics are available on the numbers of plants with fully analog, fully digital or hybrid I&C systems. 
However, approximately 40% of the world’s 439 operating power reactors, accounting for nearly all of 
the 30 countries with operating NPPs, have had some level of digital I&C upgrade to, at least, important 
safety systems. From another perspective, 90% of all the digital I&C installations that have been done 
have been modernization projects at existing reactors. 10% have been at new reactors. Of the 34 reactors 
currently under construction around the world, all of those for which construction began after 1990 have 
some digital I&C components in their control and safety systems. 
 
In Japan, the first fully digital I&C system was integrated into the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-6 advanced 
boiling water reactor (ABWR) in 1996, followed shortly by Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-7 (KK-7). Similar 
digital I&C systems are used in Hamaoka-5. Tomari-3, which will feature the first all-digital reactor 
control room, is scheduled to begin operation in 2009. 
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In China, Qinshan Phase III, with two 700 MW(e) CANDU reactors, and Tianwan-1 and -2, with two 
1000 MW(e) VVERs, have fully digital I&C systems, including both the safety and control systems, and 
partly computerized, i.e. hybrid, human-system interfaces (HSIs). China’s high-temperature gas cooled 
experimental reactor, the HTGR-10, also has fully digital safety and control I&C systems, plus a hybrid 
human-system interface in its main control room. 
 
In the UK at Sizewell B, a 1250 MW(e) PWR, all automatic functions of the safety I&C systems are 
digital, and in the main control room, all the qualified displays used in the human-system interface are 
computerized. 
 
In Russia, Kalinin-3, which was commissioned in 2004, is the first VVER-1000 equipped with digital 
I&C safety systems and digital process control systems. In addition, both its main and emergency control 
rooms have hybrid human-system interfaces. A dynamic simulator was also installed for the purpose of 
testing control functions. 
 
In the Republic of Korea, three 1000 MW(e) PWRs are under construction (Shin-Kori-1 and -2 and Shin-
Wolsong-1), all with fully digital I&C safety and control systems and hybrid human-system interfaces in 
the control rooms. 
 
In the USA, 1978 was the last year in which construction started on a reactor that eventually came online. 
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has therefore not had the same experience with digital 
I&C systems as have regulators in China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea, where the expansion of 
nuclear power is centred. Partly as a result, digital systems have not yet been approved for use as safety 
systems in operating US NPPs. Figure 4.1 is a simplified illustration of a U.S case where the I&C systems 
for controlling the plant, on the left side of the figure, are digital (computers, digital data networks, 
automatic calculations, and microprocessor-based sensors), and the I&C systems for safety, labelled 
“protection” on the right side of the figure, are analog. The figure also illustrates the features of 
independence, redundancy, and diversity that are essential in I&C systems and are outlined below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Typical I&C architecture for a plant with a digital I&C system for control and an analog I&C system for 
safety (labelled “protection” in the figure). 
Source: US National Research Council, Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in NPPs - Safety and Reliability 
Issues, 1997). 
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V. Cyber Security Regulatory Requirements for Nuclear 
Facilities 
All nuclear power plant licensees are required by regulation to establish, implement, and maintain a cyber 
security program that provides a high assurance of adequate protection against cyber-attacks. There are 
three (3) distinct groups or types of requirements that the cyber security program must satisfy: 
 
• Performance Requirements,  
• Programmatic Requirements and  
• Documentary Requirements respectively [33].  
 
This perspective provides a distinction between what outcomes are expected versus the necessary 
programmatic and documentary articles required to demonstrate the achievement of those outcomes [33]. 
VI. Global Best Practice Recommendations on Nuclear 
Cyber Security for Regulators 
Crafting a cyber security regulatory framework is a difficult and complex task for any nuclear regulator. 
The following global best practice recommendations, if strictly followed, will help in simplifying the 
process of implementing a robust nuclear cyber security defense system: 
 
a) Adopt a risk-based cyber security framework for isolating critical digital assets (CDAs) by 
thoroughly analyzing systems and processes to classify their criticality and attack paths. 
b) Institutionalize cyber security. The most challenging issue for nuclear cyber security is 
configuration integrity. The licensee must be compelled by the regulator to establish and 
demonstrate how configuration integrity is maintained in their facility. 
c) Set the scope by limiting consequences of radiological hazards. 
d) Demand verifiability and accurate system documentation on the digital characteristics of the plant 
systems, including details on system and network configuration, data flows, authorized software 
applications, engineering systems, etc. 
e) Implement an active cyber defense system rather than being reactive to cyber threats. 
f) Reduce digital complexity of CDAs as it complicates the task of securing CDAs. 
g) Avoid blind adoption of information security concepts. Refer to concepts from safety and control 
systems engineering. 
h) Get the cyber design basis threat right. Defining a DBT based on hackers and malware attack is 
too simplistic. Consider the design of modified products. 
i) Implement a cyber incident response strategy. A sophisticated cyber-attack against a nuclear 
facility implies the risk of radiological release, thereby creating a hazard to public safety and 
compromising national security. Responding to such an event is not the sole responsibility of the 
licensees. Just like in the case of physical attacks, have a solid response plan ready and tell the 
licensees what you expect from them in terms of first response. 
VII. Implications for Research and Practices 
Based on the foregoing, the questions that result from the discourse are:  
• What effect will an increase in the cost of cyber security/system protection have on nuclear 
renaissance?  
• What is the overall lesson for nuclear-emerging countries like Nigeria when it comes to 
embracing cyber security as an important piece of nuclear power program implementation? 
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• At what point will a break in the link in Cyber Attack Sophistication model become a threat to 
safety or security in terms of operation or plant availability? It is necessary to answer these 
pertinent questions in order to properly situate the findings from our discourse in line with the 
evolution of nuclear facilities in developing countries such as Nigeria. 
 
With regard to the first and second questions the cost benefit analysis of the nuclear renaissance, 
with all of its ramifications is skews positively, as the deliverables from nuclear energy provides 
many resources that result in earned revenue that can be used to address security issues. 
Although cyber security of nuclear facilities will increase the cost of operations, planning 
cybersecurity for nuclear facilities should be an integral part of the overall security processes and 
strategy. With regard to the third question, looking at the Cyber Attack Sophistication model, it 
is pertinent to mention that any form of vulnerability poses a major threat to the safety or 
security of nuclear facilities in terms of operation or plant availability.  
 
VIII. Lessons Learned 
The various cyber security incidents reported in this paper and vulnerabilities of I&Cs deployed in NPPs 
around the world hold important lessons for the cyber security of nuclear facilities and critical digital 
infrastructure in general. 
 
a. The notion of airgap separating control and protection sections of NPPs has been proved wrong. 
The case of Davis-Besse NPP shows that this is a misconception. Operators who try to monitor 
and protect every connection cannot be sure they know about all of them. Stuxnet was transmitted 
via thumb drives to infect computers that were not connected to the internet. 
 
b. Security vulnerabilities as a result of digital I&C deployment across CDAs are more complicated 
than earlier thought by alarmists and sceptics.  
 
c. The various cyber security incidents reveal that Process Control Systems (PCSs) are not immune 
from attacks since they are different from ordinary computers as widely believed.  
 
d. There is need for an understanding of current cyber security challenges and threat. NPPs 
responsible for power generation, enrichment and storage are complex computing environments 
consisting of hundreds to thousands of individual devices. These devices and computer systems 
that manage them are built from a combination of common, off-the-shell (OTS) computing 
technologies and custom, one-of-a-kind hardware, software and networking protocols. The only 
commonality between these facilities is that a large number of their critical systems tend to be 
built on legacy technologies. The current ad hoc approach to computer security that attempt to 
detect and block cyber-attacks using intrusion detection systems (IDS) is attack-centric and needs 
to change to a proactive, risk-based approach. 
 
e. Due to dynamic and complex threat landscape confronting computer systems deployed at NPPs, a 
new approach to computer security is needed, centered on sound principles and technologies that 
can be used to construct effective defenses. The vulnerability-centric security approach seeks to 
address the root cause of system insecurity - system vulnerabilities - and creates the opportunity 
for security to be more constructive. 
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IX. Summary and Conclusion 
From this study, only three out of the five countries possess written cyber regulations (U.S.A, Germany 
and Russia); China and South Africa do not have these regulations. The diversity in the ways in which 
cyber capabilities can be used poses one of the greatest challenges in Information technology. Computer 
security must be an essential component in an effective and robust nuclear security regime, so as to guard 
against increasingly sophisticated cyber threats in a digitally dependent environment. Nonetheless, 
particularly the computers used in safety and safety-related systems must be very well protected from 
possible intrusions. But other computers must be protected as well. The computers used to control the 
plant are essential to assure the continuity of power production. The computers used to control access to 
sensitive areas are needed both to prevent unauthorized access that might be part of an attack, and to 
assure authorized access both for safety and security reasons. Computers that store important and 
sensitive data have to be protected to assure that those data are not erased or stolen. Possible cyber-attacks 
could be associated with business espionage, technology theft, a disgruntled employee, a recreational 
hacker, a cyber activist, organized crime, a nation state, or a terrorist organization. 
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